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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20080378-CA

vs.
KENDRA & TIMOTHY MABEY,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANTS' CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY
"A search conducted without a warrant is a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment unless the State establishes the existence of at least one of 'a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918
(Utah App. 1992) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). One exception to the warrant requirement is consent. Id,
Appellants contend, as illustrated by the trial court's ruling, that consent was not
voluntarily given (R. 64-58).
Consent is voluntarily given when: (1) the consent is voluntary in fact; and (2) the
consent is not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d

at 918. Even if, arguendo, the State is correct and the first prong of the test is satisfied,
the prior illegality nevertheless destroys any voluntariness (Appellee Br. at 8-9).
The fundamental premise behind the second prong is that "[pjolice should not be
permitted to ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the
illegality has occurred." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990). Here, police
unlawfully entered Appellants' home, twice, without a warrant or under some wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement and performed a search (R. 105: 6; 110:
16). Only after the unlawful search was consent obtained. (R. 110: 25).
As such, the prior illegal search of Appellants' home violates the second prong of
the test set forth in Sepulveda} Under these circumstances the prior unlawful search of
Appellants' home ultimately negated any consent given, whether voluntary or not. And
to uphold the consent search as lawful flies in the face of the purpose of consent and
effectively ratifies the officers' prior illegal conduct. See, Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689.
II. THE OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF APPELANTS' HOME
VIOLATED THEIR RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Utah Supreme Court has echoed the well-founded tenet that "'physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.'" State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, f 6, 156 P.3D 795 (quoting United States v. US.
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has clearly stated that "[i]t is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that

1

The prior illegality is discussed in depth in sections II and III.
2

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)
(emphasis added).
Here, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith's warrantless search of the Appellants'
home, does not comport with the aforementioned principle that the home is a special
place and receives heightened protection from government intrusion. See Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) ("In the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes."); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d
1332 (1958) (referring to "the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle.");
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the
center of the private lives of our people."); Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f 15, 122
P.3d 506 ("Nowhere is this principle [that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable]
more zealously guarded than in a person's home, which is one of four domains expressly
granted the security promised by the Fourth Amendment.") rev'd on other grounds, 547
U.S. 398, 136 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 16-17
(Utah App. 1993) (rejecting the Terry search principle for homes because of their special
nature); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 582 (Utah 1987) ("The law traditionally has
recognized certain areas, such as the home, where one should be able to feel secure and
relax one's guard, and where people deserve special protection."). With that in mind,

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), and
United State v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir. 1998), are clearly inapposite.
A. Appellants reasonable expectation of privacy was not extinguished by the
private-party search
Although the State correctly cites Jacobsen and Paige for the proposition that a
private search may frustrate a person's expectation of privacy, neither are dispositive of
these facts (Appellee Br. at 10-14). Neither case is applicable here because police
searched Appellants' home, as opposed to a parcel or a detached garage.
The State relies on Jacobsen for the proposition that "the Fourth Amendment 'is
wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure . .. effected by a private individual not acting
as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.'" (Appellee Br. at 11) (quoting Jacobsen, 455 U.S. at 113-14).
Jacobsen, however, involves the intrusion of a box placed in the hands of a third-party.
In Jacobsen, employees of private freight-carrier, Federal Express, inspected a
package damaged by a forklift. Jacobsen, 455 U.S. at 111. After examining the package
and discovering a white powder, employees contacted the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Id. Before DEA agents arrived, the employees replaced the items back
into the box. Id. Upon arrival, a DEA agent re-opened the box, removed its contents and
field tested the white substance, which turned out to be cocaine. Id. at 111-12. The
United States Supreme Court concluded that the box was "unquestionably an 'effect'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" and protected. Id. at 114. However, the
Court held that because "[t]he initial invasions of [defendants'] package were occasioned
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by private action[,]" and the agent learned "nothing that had not previously been learned
during the private search[,] [i]t infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence
was not a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 115-20.
Here, however, a mere box is not the subject of a police search, but rather
Appellants' home. In Jacobsen, the Court indicated that
[i]t is well-settled that when an individual reveals private information to
another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information
to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit governmental use of that information. Once frustration of the
i

original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit governmental use of the now-nonprivate information: This Court
has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in a third party will not be betrayed.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct.
1619, 1624, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976)). Appellants do not dispute that private parties can
disseminate information once held in private. Mere possession of the information,
however, does not entitle police to ignore the warrant requirement, enter and search a
person's home; it merely becomes useful in obtaining a warrant, which is a preferred

route. See, State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, \ 10, 40 P.3d 1136, 1139-40; Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
The State argues that once private information inside a person's home is revealed
to a third-party, then that person no longer has an expectation of privacy in their home
(Appellee Br. at 10-12). To extend this principle from Jacobs en to the search of homes
would seriously encumber the privacy that people hold dear. It is indisputable that the
information once privately held can now be freely shared once that expectation to privacy
is exploited; but to say that a person's expectation of privacy in the place to be search is
destroyed is something different.
For example, if, as the State argues, a person's expectation of privacy is destroyed
by a private party's exposure to information, then no Fourth Amendment protection
exists. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But to conclude that because
a private party possesses information that is not exposed to the world, but was obtained
because of the owner's misplaced confidence or some other reason destroys their
continued expectation of privacy regarding other things is misplaced. This would signify
that any private party intrusion, whether it be an trespasser or an invitee, would destroy a
person's expectation to privacy and government agents could freely enter and search the
home. Certainly, this was never an intended in Jacobsen and this Court should not
extend it to give it such a broad destructive power of the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, in United States v. Paige, 135 F.3d 1012 (5th Or. 1998), the Federal
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held that a prior private-party search of the
defendant's detached garage frustrated his expectation of privacy. Id. at 1019-20. And
6

because his expectation was frustrated, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. Id. at
1021.
In Paige, the defendant hired W.R. cox Enterprises to do some roof work. Id. at
1015. Paige told two of the employees that they could go into his detached garage if they
needed anything. Id. While Paige was away, the employees went through the attic space
of the garage looking for replacement siding to repair damage they had caused. Id. In
their search, the employees discovered several packages that appeared to be drugs. Id.
The employees contacted their boss, W.R. Cox, who, in addition to owning the company,
was employed as a deputy sheriff. Id. When Cox arrived, he entered the garage and
viewed the drugs. Id. Cox contacted the local Sheriffs Department about the discovery.
Id. at 1015-16. Accompanied by Cox, a local narcotics investigator returned to Paige's
home. Id. at 1016. By this time Paige had returned home. Id. Without Paige's
permission, the investigator "went directly to the garage, set up a ladder, climbed up, and
observed the packages." Id. The investigator did not remove the contraband until after
he viewed the items, confronted Paige, and obtained his consent to conduct a more
thorough search and seize evidence. Id.
Despite the State having correctly cited the proposition that if a private party's
intrusion was "reasonably foreseeable . . . [then] the occupant will no longer possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy" and any subsequent police search will not implicate
the Fourth Amendment, the State fails to acknowledge the expressed limitation of the
holding in Paige. 136 F.3d at 1019; (Appellee Br. at 12-13). While Paige, much like
Jacobsen, stands for the idea that once a person has exposed once private information to

the outside world, any subsequent search of that that thing by the police does not
implicate Fourth Amendment protections, the Fifth Circuit expressly excluded homes
from this analysis.
In Paige, the court stressed, and the State acknowledged,that "people's homes
contain countless personal, non-contraband possessions. [And] [c]ertainly, a
homeowner's legitimate and significant privacy expectation in there possession cannot be
entirely frustrated simply because, ipso facto, a private party (e.g., an exterminator, a
carpet cleaner, or a roofer) views some of those possessions" Paige, 136 F.3d at 1020, n.
11 (emphasis added); (Appellee Br. at 12-13). Due to the sacrosanctity and nature of the
home, the court expressly refused to extend this principle or that expressed in Jacobsen
"'to cases involving private searches of residences.'" Paige, 135 F.3d at 1020 n. 11
(quoting United States v. Allen, 105 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997)). The court further
added that "[a] decision any other way would make the government the undeserving
recipient of considerable private information of a home's contents strictly through
application of an inflexible rule. We refuse to reward the government with such a
windfall...[.]" Paige, 135 F.3d at 1020 n. 11.
Similarly, here, this Court should reject Paige as presented by State because it is
an overbroad encroachment of fundamental Fourth Amendment principles and give it
weight as only non-binding federal circuit court jurisprudence. Apart from the explicit
reasoning by the Fifth Circuit for not applying the "reasonably foreseeable" test to the
search of homes, Paige is distinguishable on at least two significant points.
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First, in Paige the contractors had permission to enter Paige's garage if they
needed anything. 136 F.3d at 1015. As such, its reasonable that Cox and his employees
were permitted to enter the detached garage as needed for the purpose of completing their
work. Here, however, EMT personnel had already performed their duties after removing
Tammy Wilbanks from the home (R. 110: 5). Once the purpose for the entry was
completed, consent to enter extinguished and neither the EMT nor the officers had
authority to enter the home, especially on two separate occasions (R. 110: 6; 110: 16).
Second, the relationship between the defendants and the private parties that
searched the home in Paige and other supporting cases are much different than the
relationships in these facts. Here, Appellants concede that leaving Tammy Wilbanks
home with children may require the need to call for emergency help as required. As
such, the responding medical personnel did have consent to enter the home to render aid.
In that circumstance, the medical personnel had permission to enter the home to
accomplish that purpose alone. Once their goal was achieve, the medical personnel did
not have authority to re-enter the home especially with police; their permission expired.
Similarly, authority relied on in Paige illustrates differing relationships between
the defendants and the private party, which are distinguishable from these facts. In
United States v. Bomengo, the chief engineer for the apartment complex where the
defendant lived noticed a leak coming from defendant's apartment. 580 F.2d 173, 174-75
(5th Cir. 1978). After several unsuccessful attempts to locate defendant, the engineer
entered the apartment. Id. Accompanied by the security director, the engineer entered
the apartment and viewed two handguns in plain sight. Id. The security director then

called a local officer who came to the apartment, observed the weapons, and left to obtain
a search warrant. Id.
In United States v. York, police entered the defendant's home while accompanied
by guests of the defendant who were staying in the home. 895 F.2d 1026, 1027-28 (5th
Cir. 1990). While with the guests in the defendant's home, officers noticed two machine
guns and later notified the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (FTA)
regarding the weapons. Id. FTA agents obtained a search warrant based on the fact that
defendant's criminal status prohibited him from possessing those types of weapons. Id.
In both Bomengo and York, the building engineer and the houseguests at least
appeared to have authority to permit the officers into the home. Like the defendants in
Bomengo and York, Appellants' expectation of privacy as to the presence of contraband
in the home was now open to the world, in the sense that those private parties now had
knowledge of the contraband and could share it at their discretion. However, mere
knowledge of the contraband did not create some newly-formed authority over the home
to permit or expel persons. What is different is that in Bomengo it was reasonable for the
officer to assume that the chief engineer had authority to permit him to enter; and in York,
the officers entered the defendant's home by permission of the houseguests. Here,
however, it was wholly unreasonable for the officer to assume that the medical personnel
had authority to re-enter the home and point out what he had seen.
The only thing frustrating the Appellants' expectation of privacy was that now that
the medical personnel had entered the home and seen its contents, they could now convey
that information to whomever they chose. That does not, however, open the door to
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completely destroying the sanctity of the home by creating a loophole by which police
could now use to enter the house. As Justice Bradley emphasized in 1886, "[i]t is It is not
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
libertyt,] private property[.]" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29
L.Ed. 746 (1886).
III.

UNDER BRIGHAM CITY V. STUART, THE EXIGENCY WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS ENTRY AND
SEARCH OF THE HOME

Appellants assert that the State's contention that Brigham City v. Stuart justifies
the warrantless search of the home is misplaced (Appellee Br. at 15-17). Rather Stuart is
a narrowly-tailored opinion, ruling on the issue of "whether police may enter a home
without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an
occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury." Brigham City
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Warrantless
searches, under Brigham City v. Stuart, turn on two elements: (1) whether there is a
serious injury or an imminent threat of such injury; and (2) whether the basis for belief of
such an injury was objectively reasonable. 547 U.S. at 403-04. Here, neither element
exist.
First, there is no indication in the present case that there was a serious injury or
even an imminent threat of such an injury. Cf. Id. at 403. Generally, warrants are
required to search a person's home '"unless the exigencies of the situation' make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). As the United States Supreme Court
points out, however, "[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need
to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury."
In Stuart, officers responded to a call regarding a loud party. 547 U.S. at 400.
After some investigation, officers entered the backyard of the home and observed a fight
through a screen door of the house. Officers observed a juvenile strike another person in
the face, which caused the victim to spit out blood. As others became involved and tried
to restrain the juvenile, officers entered the home without a warrant. 547 U.S. at 400.
The present facts are distinguishable.
Here, officers were dispatched to the Appellants' home as part of a medical call
(R. 110:4). When Officer Hurst arrived at the home, Tammy Wilbanks was being loaded
into the ambulance (R. 110:5). One of the ambulance crewmembers alerted Officer Hurst
that there was marijuana in the home (R. 110:5). Officer Hurst also observed marijuana
stuck to the ambulance stretcher as Tammy Wilbanks was being loaded into the
ambulance (R. 110:5). Unlike Stuart, Officer Hurst never personally observed nor was
he told second-hand by anybody at the scene that there was a serious injury or even the
threat of a serious injury occurring inside the house. Although the State colors the facts
to make it seem as if there were children inside the home and could be in danger because
they could be in the vicinity of marijuana, those facts, even if true, are irrelevant under a
Stuart analysis (Appellee Br. at 16-17).
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As stated, Stuart requires that the "need to assist persons who are seriously injured
or threatened with such injury." 547 U.S. at 403. There, officers witnessed and assault
that caused the victim to spit blood and the Court felt this to be a sufficient injury to
establish exigency and justify a warrantless entry. 547 U.S. at 406. Here, the possibility
that children were in the same house as marijuana is disconcerting; however, it certainly
fails to rise to the level of a serious injury or even the tlireat of such an injury. As stated
by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency;' Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Mincy v. Arizona, 431 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978) (internal quotations omitted). Because there was no need to preserve life or avoid
serious injury Officer Hurst's search was illegal.
Second, even if there existed a need to assist seriously injured persons or a threat
of a serious injury, Officer Hurst's basis was objectively unreasonable. "An action is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment... 'as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the action.'" Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)). Here,
the officers' action were objectively unreasonable.
In Stuart, the United States Supreme Court held that the officers' entry was
"plainly reasonable under the circumstances." 547 U.S. at 406. The Court reasoned that
because the officers personally viewed a hostile and violent juvenile, they had an
"objectively reasonable basis for believing that both that the injured adult might need

help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning." 547 U.S. at 406.
Conversely, the present facts starkly contrast those presented to Officer Hurst.
Here, Officer Hurst arrived at the Appellants' home to aid an emergency medical
call (R. 110:5). By the time Officer Hurst arrived, however, the emergency seemed to be
under control (R. 110:5). At no time did Officer Hurst indicate facts that would be
objectively reasonable to justify a warrantless search of the home. The State indicates
that after he was notified about the contraband, the officer was concerned about whether
there were children in the home, although he knew one was in the yard and the others
were with a neighbor (Appellee Br. at 16-17). Although the State rejects the criticism
regarding the officer's failure to speak to Tammy Wilbanks before rushing into the home,
there were still more options to pursue (Appellee Br. at 16-17, n. 7). Whether Tammy
Wilbanks was available appears to be a disputed factual issue; regardless, the officer
could still have inquired of the ambulance crewmember(s) that entered the home, the
children, or even the neighbors that could have alleviated any safety concerns the officer
had before jumping to an unreasonable conclusion and entering the home. While the
officers in Stuart had solid, objective reasoning to justify the warrantless entry, here,
Officer Hurst acted on a hunch, and did so without making a simple inquiry.
IV. BECAUSE THE OFFICERS CLEARLY VIOLATED APPELLANTS5
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, ANY CONSENT
SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED WAS TAINTED BY THAT PRIOR
ILLEGALITY
Conducting warrantless searches of Appellants' home, on two occasions, violated
their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
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As such, that prior illegality tainted the consent given. Under the analysis proffered by
the State, this Court should look at three factors to determine whether the consent was
obtained by exploitation of the prior illegality: That analysis is, however, improper.
"Searches conducted 'outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684,
687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). The issue here is whether the officers unlawful conduct tainted the
consent given by Appellants (Appllee Br. at 17-20).
"When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an illegal police
action (e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), the prosecution 'has a much heavier burden to
satisfy than when proving consent to search' which does not follow police misconduct.
Arroyo,796 P.2d at 688. The State's heavy burden to show consent was valid consists of
two parts: (1) whether the consent was voluntary in fact, which is a "fact intensive issue
to be determined by the totality of the circumstances[;]" and (2) whether the consent was
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,
918 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
Here, the facts clearly indicate the lack of consent under the two-part test.
Appellants' reaffirm that "[ejven if consent was voluntarily given, the subsequent consent
does not cure the original illegality of the prior searches" (Appellee Br. at 14). In
considering the second prong - whether consent was obtained by police exploitation of a
prior illegality - courts have considered three relevant factors: "(1) the 'purpose and

flagrancy' of the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence of intervening circumstances,' and (3)
the 'temporal proximity' between the illegal detention and consent." State v. Hansen,
2002 UT 125,1 64, 63 P.3d 650.
First, the "purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct" clearly weighs in favor of
police exploitation. Hansen, 2002 UT at \ 64. This "factor directly relates to the
deterrent value of suppression." Hansen, 2002 UT at^ 64. Although the officers in this
case were not as forthcoming with their flagrancy as the officers in Hansen, their actions
were nonetheless flagrant. See Hansen, 2002 UT at \ 66. Here, Officer Hurst entered the
home without a warrant without regard for the need for a warrant and under the guise of
some exigency (R. 110:6-7). Later, Sergeant Smith entered the home without a warrant
because he "needed to see" the contraband (R. 110:16, 27). Subsequently, Sergeant
Smith confronted Appellants about what he had observed and that the items were going
to be taken and they were going to be arrested whether they consented to the search or
not (R. 110:25). Clearly, the officers' flagrant disregard for obtaining a warrant, coupled
with Sergeant Smith's statements, benefited them in obtaining consent because police
told them they were going to get into the house either way (R. 110:25).
Second, the intervening circumstances, by themselves, are insufficient to
completely overcome the police's prior illegality. Although Sergeant Smith advised
Appellants of their Miranda rights, that alone, fails to establish a "clean break in the
chain of events between the misconduct and the ... consent." Hansen, 2002 UT at f6S
(quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1274 (Utah 1993)).
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Third, the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and consent weigh in
favor of concluding that consent was gained by exploitation of a prior illegality. See
Hansen, 2002 UT at f 64. While the State notes that the police searches occurred prior to
Appellants' arrival, it nonetheless occurred within the same temporal proximity
(Appellee Br. at 19-20). While the record does not indicate the amount of time that
elapsed between the multiple searches, the fact that police remained at the scene and
waited for Appellants to arrive indicates exploitation. On one hand, if the time between
the searches and Appellants arriving was so short that it was more convenient for the
officers to ask for consent based on their illegality than seek a warrant, then the temporal
proximity is a considerable factor. On the other, if the time between the searches and
their arrival was more significant, allowing officers more time to obtain a warrant, then
its reasonable to infer they were using their illegal search to gain consent. Either way,
police used time between the unlawful searches and gaining consent to their advantage,
regardless of their ability to obtain a warrant.
Therefore, based on these factors, the prior illegality tainted any consent given and
the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690
(holding that "[t]he 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine has been extended to invalidate
consents, which, despite being voluntary, are nonetheless exploitation of the prior police
illegality").

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Kendra and Timothy Mabey respectfully request that
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress and vacate their
conditional pleas, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further
proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28™ day of August, 2009.

Margaret P.Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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